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Aristotle	(versus	Kant)	on	Autonomy	and
Moral	Maturity
Molly	Brigid	Flynn
Assumption	College
On	 the	 one	 hand,	 we	 are	 persons,	 thus	 free	 morally,	 and	 we	 are	 capable	 of	 becoming
morally	mature.	On	the	other	hand,	we	are	social	animals.	Often	these	sides	of	human	life	seem
at	odds.	 I	will	compare	Kant’s	modern	view	with	Aristotle’s	classical	view	of	 freedom	and
moral	 maturity	 to	 illustrate	 that	 how	 we	 philosophically	 describe	 our	 freedom	 makes	 a
difference	for	how	we	understand	our	goal	of	moral	maturity.
Kant	 emphasizes	 autonomy	 as	 the	 essence	 of	 morality,	 and	 this	 autonomy	 or	 freedom
contains	both	a	negative	 from	aspect	and	a	positive	 to	aspect.	The	 individual’s	moral	 life	 is
free	 from	 two	 things	 especially:	 desires	 and	other	 people.	He	 emphasizes	 freedom	 from	 the
passions	 because	 the	 passions,	 as	 entwined	 with	 the	 body,	 are	 one	 way	 in	 which	 we	 are
determined	 by	 the	 laws	 of	 physics.	 This	 aspect	 of	 freedom	 is	 especially	 emphasized	 in	 the
Groundwork	 and	 in	 the	 second	Critique.	According	 to	 his	 epistemological	metaphysics,	we
have	no	direct	access,	as	knowing	beings,	to	the	noumenal,	to	the	real	in	itself.	It	is	in	the	moral
life	alone,	 through	our	willing	of	 the	moral	 law,	which	we	break	 through	 into	 the	noumenal.
The	will,	 in	willing	 the	 rule	of	 reason,	 is	 free	 from	 the	phenomenal	 realm	and	 its	 laws,	but
when	 we	 allow	 our	 passions	 to	 determine	 what	 we	 do,	 we	 give	 ourselves	 over	 to	 the
phenomenal	and	 to	physics	and	are	 thus	not	 free.	 In	“What	 is	Enlightenment?”	 freedom	from
others	 is	Kant’s	 focus.	To	be	morally	mature	 is	 to	 be	 autonomous	 from	other	 persons.	This,
also,	is	grounded	in	Kant’s	conception	of	the	moral	law.	Each	person,	having	reason,	has	equal
and	easy	access	 to	 the	moral	 law,	 the	categorical	 imperative.	The	equality	of	access	here	 is
important.	 The	 moral	 law	 is	 built	 into	 reason,	 and	 the	 willing	 of	 the	 moral	 law	 is	 in	 fact
nothing	 other	 than	 the	willing	 of	 reason.	 Because	 all	 persons	 have	 reason,	we	 all	 have	 the
moral	law	given	to	us	directly,	rather	than	through	others.	The	ease	of	access	is	important	here,
too.	Kant	claims	to	merely	formalize	and	defend	philosophically,	what	we	all	know	intuitively:
the	golden	 rule,	consistency	of	action,	 treating	persons	as	persons.	Making	some	 individuals
more	authoritative	morally	offends	against	both	the	ease	and	the	equality	of	access	to	the	moral
law.	Being	determined	by	desire	subjects	the	will	to	the	laws	of	physics;	by	looking	to	others
as	 moral	 authorities,	 we	 abdicate	 our	 sovereign	 throne	 as	 persons	 with	 reason	 and	 as
containing	the	moral	law	within	us.	In	both	cases,	freedom	to	exercise	our	essential	dignity	as
persons	 requires	 freedom	 from	 desires	 and	 others	 lest	 we	 displace	 our	 own	 inner	 moral
authority,	estranging	ourselves	 from	the	moral	 law	and	from	our	own	authenticity	as	persons
with	 reason.	 Of	 course,	 in	 being	 truly	 free,	 we	 are	 also	 bound.	 Instead	 of	 advocating
lawlessness	as	 freedom,	Kant	maintains	 that	 freedom	is	binding	oneself	 to	duty.	Thus,	moral
maturity	is	giving	oneself	the	law	that	defines	one’s	essence	as	a	person	and	gives	one	dignity.
Kant’s	 ethics	 focuses	 on	 autonomy	 or	 moral	 maturity	 as	 rationality	 and	 freedom	 from
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heteronomy.	Aristotle’s	ethics	does	not	focus	on	these	concepts,	but	rather	on	the	inborn	human
telos,	 happiness,	 the	 virtues	 and	 their	 exercise,	 prudence,	 friendship,	 and	 contemplation	 –
anything	 that	 goes	 into	 a	human	 life	 turned	out	well,	 to	use	Robert	Spaemann’s	 rendering	of
eudaimonia	(19).	I	would	like	to	force	Aristotle	to	speak	in	our	modern	idiom.	What	does	he
have	to	say	about	us	in	terms	of	autonomy	and	moral	maturity?
If	we	focus	on	the	end	of	De	Anima	III.11-12	(434a	and	434b),	we	see	that	freedom	first
arises	 for	 Aristotle	 in	 the	 non-rational	 voluntary	 movement	 of	 animals.	 Having	 sensation,
animals	 also	 experience	 pleasures	 and	 pains.	 The	 lowest	 level	 animals	 have	 touch	 and	 an
indefinite	 imagination,	 but	 lack	 the	 distant	 senses	 of	 sight,	 hearing,	 and	 smell	 and	 lack	 the
capacity	 for	 forward	movement.	 Even	 these	 “imperfect	 animals,”	 like	 jellyfish,	 perform	 the
voluntary	 local	motion	 of	 taking	 in	 desired	 things	 and	 rejecting	 undesired	 things.	 So-called
“perfect”	animals,	having	some	distant	senses,	also	perform	forward	movements,	exercising	a
mobility	 to	 pull	 toward	 or	 push	 away	 from	 objects	 that	 cause	 pleasure	 or	 pain.	 This	 is	 a
freedom	 to	move,	but	 it	 is	not	a	 raw	freedom	–	 it	 is	bound	 to	a	particular	sensed	 thing	as	 it
shows	up	as	good	in	pleasure	and	desire.	At	the	next	level,	most	animals	also	have	a	definite
imagination,	a	quasi-sensory	discernment	of	objects	not	immediately	given	to	the	five	senses.
This	 is	 an	 additional	 level	 of	 freedom:	 freedom	 from	 the	 immediate,	 sensed	 present	 and
freedom	to	pursue	or	flee	the	sensible	thing	not	here	but	just	around	the	corner.	By	rejecting	as
absurd	 the	denial	of	voluntary	movement	 to	children	and	brutes,	Aristotle	 insists	 that	all	 this
movement	in	response	to	sensed	and	imagined	things	is	willed	movement.	It	is	on	this	ground
that	 true,	 human	 freedom	 is	 built.	 The	 highest	 level	 of	 animal	 life	 is	 the	 adult	 human,	 but	 it
remains	part	of	this	continuum	of	animals.	As	De	Anima	 III.10	explains	 (433b),	we	have	not
just	a	sensory	imagination	but	also	a	“calculative”	imagination	by	which	we	can	consider	and
weigh	several	goods	 together,	and	with	a	deeper	memory	and	 longer	sense	of	 the	 future,	we
discern	many	more	goods	to	compare	and	weigh.	With	reason	we	can	recognize	the	best	and
decide	 upon	 certain	 goods	 among	 many.	 This	 opens	 up	 the	 possibilities	 of	 continence	 and
incontinence,	and	of	deliberation	and	of	choice.	In	De	Anima	 III.9-12,	reason	appears	mostly
as	multiplying	the	number	of	things	that	we	can	discern	and	desire.	From	Nicomachean	Ethics,
we	 also	 know	 that	 reason	 opens	 up	 new	 type	 of	 goods:	 reason	 itself	 as	 both	 practical	 and
theoretical	is	good,	and	it	is	so	not	merely	as	a	new	tool	to	get	more	of	the	same	lower-level
goods.
At	each	 level	of	 animal	 life,	voluntary	movement	 involves	 two	key	 factors,	 a	 faculty	of
discrimination	 or	 knowledge	 (e.g.,	 touch,	 sight,	 imagination,	 and	 thought)	 and	 a	 faculty	 of
desire	 (e.g.,	 hunger,	 fear,	 and	wish).	Voluntary	movement	 requires	 a	 particular	 object	 to	 be
apprehended	and	to	be	desired,	so	voluntary	movement	is	always	bound	to	how	things	appear
to	us.	Notice	how	Aristotle	distinguishes	between	touch	and	taste,	on	the	one	hand,	and	sight,
smell,	 and	 hearing,	 on	 the	 other;	 then	 between	 sensation	 and	 imagination;	 then	 between	 a
sensory	and	a	calculative	imagination;	and	then	between	imagination	and	thought.	These	are	all
faculties	 of	 discrimination,	 but	 at	 each	 level	 the	 animal	 increases	 its	 range,	 apprehending
objects	further	away	in	space	or	time.	Aristotle	hierarchically	orders	the	levels	of	animal	life
according	 to	 the	 degree	 of	 freedom	 from	 the	 immediately	 discerned	 and	 desired	 sensory
objects.	At	each	level,	the	expanded	range	of	discrimination	out	of	the	sensed	present	opens	up
a	 new	 range	 of	 freedom,	 and	 that	 means	 a	 new	 set	 of	 desirable	 objects	 shows	 up.	 But
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movement	is	still	always	bound	to	an	object	apprehended	and	desired.	For	Kant,	we	must	in
being	morally	mature	 not	 allow	our	will	 to	 be	 determined	 by	 particular	 desired	 goods.	 For
Kant,	we	must,	 rather,	declare	 independence	from	the	appearances	and	always	will	 the	good
will	itself.	In	contrast,	for	Aristotle,	our	sensory	apprehension	of	and	desire	for	goods	do	not
undermine	freedom	or	voluntariness	but	form	its	ground.
For	Aristotle,	reason	both	enhances	and	catapults	us	beyond	this	apprehension	and	desire
for	material	 goods.	 Thought,	wish,	 and	 choice	 are	 part	 of	 the	 hierarchy	 –	 the	 continuum,	 in
animal	life	of	the	discernment	of	objects,	the	desire	for	goods,	and	self-movement	–	but	reason
also	 transforms	 all	 of	 this	 upon	which	 it	 is	 built.	 In	 the	 adult	 human,	 thought	 often	 opposes
desire	for	material	goods	sensed	or	imagined,	giving	rise	to	continence	and	incontinence.	Most
of	the	practical	virtues	deal	with	mundane	material	or	interpersonal	goods,	many	of	the	same
type	that	animals	can	discern	and	desire,	such	as	food,	safety,	victory,	power,	and	sex.	But	we
have	the	ability	to	deal	with	these	animal	goods	in	a	human	way,	by	infusing	our	desires	and
actions	with	 reason.	 In	doing	so,	we	can	get	not	only	more	of	 these	goods	or	get	 them	more
securely,	but	we	also	get	 to	accomplish	noble	or	beautiful	actions	with	 them.	One	need	only
recall	 one’s	 last	 activity	 involving	 such	 animal	 goods	 as	 sex,	 food,	 or	 power	 to	 realize	 the
extent	to	which	reason	humanizes	these	goods,	transforming	them	and	making	our	actions	with
them	more	 beautiful	 or	more	 ugly	 than	 any	 animal	movement	 could	 be.	 Like	 his	 account	 of
voluntary	movement,	Aristotle’s	 ethics	 allows	us	 to	 understand	both	 the	 continuity	 of	 human
life	with	brute	life	and	the	radical	changes	that	reason	brings	to	the	animal	aspects	of	our	lives.
Because	Aristotle	does	not	share	Kant’s	conception	of	the	forces	of	matter	as	completely	and
perfectly	deterministic,	freedom	for	him	does	not	require	autonomy	defined	against	the	desires
the	way	 it	 does	 for	 Kant.	 Freedom	 for	 Aristotle	 arises	within	 nature,	 not	 against	 it,	 and	 in
action	we	are	always	aiming	for	a	particular	good	as	it	appears	to	us	through	the	imagination.
The	morally	mature	man	is	not	free	from	the	apparent	good,	but	he	is	the	one	who	uses	reason
to	ensure	that	the	good	appears	to	him	truly.
What	about	autonomy	from	others?	Authority	is	the	function	of	those	capable	of	directing
others	to	the	true	or	the	good.	The	virtuous	person	successfully	trains	his	desires	to	harmonize
with	the	good.	This	training	must	start	in	childhood.	The	need	for	others’	authority,	especially
in	 childhood,	 follows	 from	 the	 non-rational	 foundations	 of	 voluntary	movement.	Virtue	 does
not	 consist	 in	 the	mere	habituation	of	one’s	desires,	but	 it	does	 require	 it.	And	 this	 starts	 in
childhood	 by	 means	 of	 authorities	 praising	 or	 blaming	 our	 non-chosen	 but	 voluntary
movements,	so	that	we	begin	to	understand	responsibility	and	so	that	our	pleasures	and	pains
are	connected	with	their	proper	objects.
That	 chosen	 virtuous	 actions	 by	 adult	 humans	 emerge	 out	 of	 the	 pre-chosen	 voluntary
movement	of	children	shows	that	others’	authority	has	a	positive,	even	crucial,	role	in	ethics,	at
least	 in	childhood.	What	about	adulthood?	For	Aristotle	(as	for	Kant),	 the	virtuous	person	is
autonomous	 from	 others’	 direction	 and	 is	 a	 law	 unto	 himself	 (Politics	 1284a14).	 But	 as
Aristotle	claims	 in	 the	Rhetoric,	 the	moral	 law	 is	not	 expressible	 in	any	 finite	 formula.	Our
best	 access	 to	 this	 moral	 law	 is	 the	matured	 faculties	 of	 the	 virtuous	 person.	 The	 virtuous
person	 is	 the	 measure,	 and	 like	 the	 measuring	 stick	 from	 Lesbos,	 he	 bends	 with	 the	 oddly
shaped	 situations	 to	measure	 them	 correctly	 when	 the	 letter	 of	 the	 law	 fails	 because	 of	 its
generality	and	inflexibility.	Although	raised	by	others	and	by	the	law,	the	virtuous	person	has
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not	merely	 adopted	others’	views	or	 assimilated	well	 to	his	 culture.	With	 their	 help,	 he	has
acquired	 for	himself	a	 sensitively	 tuned	 faculty	 to	discriminate	 the	good	and	bad	 in	his	own
and	in	others’	actions.	He	can	even	recognize	the	inadequacies	of	the	law	that	have	cultivated
this	sensitivity	in	him.	Though	Kant	sees	as	necessary,	for	a	historically	limited	time,	a	tough
but	enlightened	authority,	like	Frederick	II	of	Prussia,	who	can	set	the	ground	for	a	people	to
progressively	enlighten	themselves,	Aristotle	does	not	think	the	multitude	of	people	can	reach
moral	 maturity.	 For	 Aristotle,	 virtuous	 people	 really	 are	 permanently	 invaluable	 as	 moral
authorities	for	the	multitude,	which	is	stuck	in	the	middle	in	continence	or	incontinence.
Aristotle	 denies	 both	 the	 equality	 and	 the	 ease	 of	 access	 to	moral	 correctness,	 the	 two
features	of	Kant’s	categorical	 imperative	 that	allow	Kant	 to	denigrate,	as	a	 form	of	 immoral
heteronomy,	 the	exercise	and	honoring	of	moral	 authority.	Many	people	do	not	become	 fully
virtuous,	and	 for	 them	 the	 law	and	others’	authority	 remains	 important	 throughout	 life.	 In	 the
Nicomachean	Ethics,	Aristotle	quotes	Hesiod:	“Altogether	best	is	he	who	has	insight	into	all
things,	 /	But	 good	 in	 his	 turn	 is	 he	who	 trusts	 one	who	 speaks	well.	 /	But	whoever	 neither
himself	discerns,	nor,	harkening	to	another,	/	Lays	to	heart	what	he	says,	that	one	for	his	part	is
a	 useless	man”	 (1095b).	 Although	 autonomous	 insight	 is	 best,	 we	who	 lack	 insight	 into	 all
things	 are	 foolish	 if	 ungrateful	 for	 authorities	 with	 better	 understanding	 than	 ourselves.
Aristotle	also	denies	the	ease	of	knowledge	of	right	and	wrong.	In	a	rejection	of	anything	like
the	categorical	imperative,	Aristotle	denies	that	any	formula	or	single	principle	is	an	infallible
guide	 to	moral	action.	All	actions	deal	with	particulars,	and	general	principles	are	good	but
imperfect	guides.	The	morally	serious	and	virtuous	person	may	not	need	moral	authorities,	but
the	 difficulty	 of	 knowing	 the	 best	 course	 of	 action	 may	 make	 other	 virtuous	 people
epistemically	 useful	 even	 to	 the	 morally	 mature	 man.	 Aristotle	 tells	 us	 that	 it	 is	 easier	 to
perceive,	 and	 thus	 enjoy	 contemplatively,	 the	 good	 actions	 of	 others.	 Moreover,	 in	 good
friendship	decent	people	make	each	other	better	 “by	putting	 their	 friendship	 to	work	and	by
straightening	one	another	out,	for	they	have	their	rough	edges	knocked	off	by	the	things	they	like
in	one	another”	(1172a).	It	might	also	be	easier	to	perceive	the	imperfection	of	actions	done	by
others.	Other	people’s	opinions	and	actions	would	then	take	on	a	positive	role	 in	Aristotle’s
ethics,	 even	 for	 the	 virtuous	 person.	 The	 happy	 life	 of	 the	 person	who	 puts	 virtue	 to	work
throughout	 life	 is	 “self-sufficient”	 (1097b),	 but	 this	 self-sufficiency	 requires	 the	 virtue	 and
happiness	of	friends,	as	well.
Finally,	Aristotle	does	come	closer	to	Kant	when	he	denies	that	reason	is	merely	another
natural	thing.	For	Kant,	the	radical	independence	of	reason	from	nature	makes	freedom	and	a
good	 will	 the	 ultimate	 goods	 for	 us:	 it	 is	 with	 reason’s	 freedom	 that	 I	 attain	 the	 real	 me,
affirming	the	authentic	dignity	of	my	personhood,	and	here	I	break	away	from	the	appearances
and	 get	 through	 to	 the	 really	 real.	We	 need	 to	 understand	 reason	 and	 freedom	 as	 radically
different	 from	nature	 in	 order	 to	 be	 persons,	 and	 to	 be	 free	 from	 the	 determinism	of	 nature,
according	to	Kant.
Likewise,	 for	 Aristotle,	 I	 am	 most	 truly	 my	 intellect,	 and	 true	 self-love	 means	 acting
reasonably,	 serving	 and	 exercising	 this	 highest	 part	 of	 me	 most	 of	 all.	 And	 likewise	 for
Aristotle,	reason	is	not	just	another	part	of	nature.	It	is	ultimately	god-like	and	immaterial.	It	is
simultaneously	 part	 of	 us	 and	 beyond	 us,	 and	with	 it	 we	 can	 really,	 though	 imperfectly,	 be
united	with	 the	most	 real	 beings	 in	 and	behind	 the	 cosmos.	Nevertheless,	Aristotle	 draws	 a
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quite	un-Kantian	conclusion	from	the	non-naturalness	of	reason	and	the	identity	of	the	core	of
the	 person	 with	 the	 intellect.	 After	 all,	 Aristotle	 does	 not	 have	 a	 problem	 explaining	 free
movement	within	the	physical	world,	as	Kant	does.	Rather,	it	is	in	the	theoretical	operation	of
the	 intellect	 that	 the	moral	 life	 is	 culminated	 and	 surpassed,	 in	 our	 knowing	 and	 not	 in	 our
doing.	Moral	maturity	 and	 autonomy	of	 the	person,	 for	Aristotle,	 is	 found	most	 of	 all	 not	 in
willing	 but	 in	 knowing,	 in	 this	 superhuman	 ability	 in	which	we	only	 share	 but	 in	which	we
should	strive	to	share	as	much	as	possible.
For	 both	 Kant	 and	 Aristotle	 the	 person	 is	 most	 of	 all	 his	 reason,	 and	 moral	 maturity
requires	 a	 certain	 autonomy	 from	 desires	 and	 from	 others’	 opinions.	 But	 for	 Aristotle	 our
freedom	arises	out	of	nature	rather	than	as	a	completely	separate	domain.	Because	of	this	and
because	knowledge	of	the	moral	law	is	not	given	easily	or	equally,	to	act	morally	we	need	a
prudence	 that	 is	 based	 in	 the	 full	 maturation	 of	 our	 animality	 (i.e.,	 our	 desires)	 and	 a
willingness	to	submit	to	proper	authority	when	it	speaks.	A	deterministic	view	of	nature	mixed
with	a	dedication	to	the	freedom	and	dignity	of	persons	leads	Kant	to	distance	the	person	from
his	animal	side,	and	Kant’s	view	of	the	ease	and	equality	of	access	to	the	moral	law	leads	him
to	 denigrate	 authority	 and	 others’	 roles	 in	 our	 moral	 activity.	 But	 does	 not	 moral	 maturity
require	maturation	of	the	whole	person,	including	the	animal	side?	And	is	it	not	morally	mature
to	recognize	when	others	speak	with	authority	in	an	area	new	to	us	and	to	recognize	that	others
are	an	integral	part	of	our	own	moral	life?	Kant	would	doubtless	also	answer	these	questions
affirmatively,	 but	 Aristotle’s	 psychology	 and	 ethics	 allow	 us	 to	 recognize	 these	 facts	 more
easily	 than	Kant’s	do	and	so	better	 illuminate	human	freedom	and	autonomy	for	us.	Aristotle
allows	us	better	to	understand	our	complex	nature	as	part	of	the	continuum	of	animal	life,	while
also	 showing	 how	 reason	 transforms	 and	 allows	 us	 to	 surpass	 the	 merely	 animal.	 Moral
maturity	is	not	just	the	autonomous	rule	of	reason,	but	it	is	really	the	maturation	of	the	whole
person:	animal,	social,	and	rational.
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